Parapsychology and the mind-body problem

Inquiry 30 (September):215-25 (1987)
The paper argues that there are effectively only two tenable theories of the mind?brain relationship: ?epiphenomenalism? and ?radical dualism? (interactionism). So long as account is taken only of the conventional sciences, the odds are heavily stacked in favour of epiphenomenalism. However, once the findings of parapsychology are admitted to consideration, a very different situation obtains. It is here argued that parapsychology only makes sense within a dualist metaphysic
Keywords Body  Metaphysics  Mind  Parapsychology
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DOI 10.1080/00201748708602120
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Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Marsha P. Hanen, Margaret J. Osler & Robert G. Weyant (eds.) (1980). Science, Pseudo-Science, and Society. Published for the Calgary Institute for the Humanities by Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

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