‘Just The Facts’: Thick Concepts and Hermeneutical Misfit

Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):373-395 (2025)
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Abstract

Oppressive ideology regularly misrepresents features of structural injustice as normal or appropriate. I argue that resisting such injustice therefore requires critical examination of the evaluative judgments encoded in shared concepts. I diagnose a mechanism of ideological misevaluation, which I call hermeneutical misfit. Hermeneutical misfit occurs when thick concepts, or concepts which both describe and evaluate, mobilise ideologically warped evaluative judgments which do not fit the facts (e.g. slutty). These ill-fitted thick concepts in turn are regularly deployed as if they merely describe (hence ‘just the facts’). I argue that, via this descriptive masquerade, ill-fitted thick concepts smuggle in warped evaluative judgments alongside apparently value-neutral ‘mere facts’, a process which both reinforces those judgments and increases the difficulty of critique. I suggest that, to resist this process, we should develop collective consciousness and articulate ‘meta-hermeneutical resources,’ or thick concepts which encode critique of other, ill-fitted concepts (e.g. slut-shaming).

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Rowan Bell
University of Guelph

References found in this work

Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny.Kate Manne - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology.Alison M. Jaggar - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):151 – 176.

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