What should we believe about the future?

Synthese:1-12 (forthcoming)
Miloud Belkoniene
Université de Fribourg
This paper discusses the ability of explanationist theories of epistemic justification to account for the justification we have for holding beliefs about the future. McCain’s explanationist account of the relation of evidential support is supposedly in a better position than other theories of this type to correctly handle cases involving beliefs about the future. However, the results delivered by this account have been questioned by Byerly and Martin. This paper argues that McCain’s account is, in fact, able to deliver plausible results in cases involving such beliefs and that explanationism, if properly articulated, is illuminating with respect to the justification we have for holding such beliefs, as it manages to correctly distinguish evidence that only supports believing probabilistic claims about the future from evidence that is sufficient to believe that a particular event will happen.
Keywords Explanationism  Evidential support  Epistemic justification  Beliefs about the future  Statistical evidence
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1789-5
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References found in this work BETA

Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
The Probable and the Provable.Samuel Stoljar & L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):457.
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.

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