Analyticity and Syntheticity in Type Theory Revisited

Review of Symbolic Logic (forthcoming)
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Abstract

I discuss problems with Martin-Löf's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in constructive type theory and propose a revision of his views. I maintain that a judgment is analytic when its correctness follows exclusively from the evaluation of the expressions occurring in it. I argue that Martin-Löf's claim that all judgments of the forms a : A and a = b : A are analytic is unfounded. As I shall show, when A evaluates to a dependent function type (x : B) → C, all judgments of these forms fail to be analytic and therefore end up as synthetic. Going beyond the scope of Martin-Löf's original distinction, I also argue that all hypothetical judgments are synthetic and show how the analytic-synthetic distinction reworked here is capable of accommodating judgments of the forms A type and A = B type as well. Finally, I consider and reject an alternative account of analyticity as decidability and assess Martin-Löf's position on the analytic grounding of synthetic judgments.

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2023-06-29

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Bruno Bentzen
Zhejiang University

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References found in this work

Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl & J. N. Findlay - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):384-398.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):419-425.
Propositions as Intentions.Bruno Bentzen - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (2):143-160.

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