Law and Philosophy 23 (6):615 - 630 (2004)

Theodore M. Benditt
University of Pittsburgh (PhD)
In recent years a number of writers have maintained that law can usefully be illuminated by game theory. Some believe that game theory can provide guidance in formulating rules for dealing with specific problems. Others advance the philosophically ambitious contention that we can gain a better understanding and/or appreciation of law by seeing it in terms of game-theoretic ideas. My purpose in this article is to examine some claims of the latter sort, and in particular to ask how distant law can be from the assumptions of game theory and still be informed by it. Models are not expected to fit precisely what they model, but at some point the deviation is too great and there is a failure to illuminate.
Keywords Law   Logic   Philosophy of Law   Law Theory/Law Philosophy   Political Science   Social Issues
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:LAPH.0000031086.94196.ce
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,943
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
34 ( #307,897 of 2,426,897 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #541,589 of 2,426,897 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes