An intuitionistic interpretation of Bishop’s philosophy

Philosophia Mathematica 32 (3):307-331 (2024)
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Abstract

The constructive mathematics developed by Bishop in Foundations of Constructive Analysis succeeded in gaining the attention of mathematicians, but discussions of its underlying philosophy are still rare in the literature. Commentators seem to conclude, from Bishop’s rejection of choice sequences and his severe criticism of Brouwerian intuitionism, that he is not an intuitionist–broadly understood as someone who maintains that mathematics is a mental creation, mathematics is meaningful and eludes formalization, mathematical objects are mind-dependent constructions given in intuition, and mathematical truths are experienceable. This paper develops and defends an intuitionistic interpretation of Bishop’s philosophical views.

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Bruno Bentzen
Zhejiang University

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References found in this work

Propositions as Intentions.Bruno Bentzen - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (2):143-160.
Intuitionism and Formalism.L. E. J. Brouwer - 1913 - Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 20:81-96.
Intuition, Iteration, Induction.Mark van Atten - 2024 - Philosophia Mathematica 32 (1):34-81.
X*—Mathematical Intuition.Charles Parsons - 1980 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1):145-168.

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