Assertion, knowledge and predictions

Analysis 72 (1):102-105 (2012)
Abstract
John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA.
Keywords assertion  prediction  knowledge norm  norms of assertion  Matthew Weiner
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr123
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References found in this work BETA
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
``Must We Know What We Say?&Quot.Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Moore's Paradox, Assertion and Knowledge.O. R. Jones - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):183 - 186.
More on Moore.Michael Welbourne - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):237 - 241.

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Citations of this work BETA
Gricean Quality.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):689-703.
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
Knowledge FIrst?Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - Palgrave Macmillian.

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