Are We Causally Redundant?

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-8 (2017)
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Abstract

Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an exception for us, conscious beings, and that we are something over and above simples arranged in suitable ways, unlike tables or statues. I resist this need for making an exception, using the resources of four-dimensionalism.

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Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg

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