Branching versus divergent possible worlds

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):12-20 (2005)

Authors
Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg
Abstract
David Lewis' modal counterpart theory falls prey to the famous Saul Kripke's objection, and this is mostly due to his 'static' ontology (divergence) of possible worlds. This paper examines a genuinely realist but different, branching ontology of possible worlds and a new definition of the counterpart relation, which attempts to provide us with a better account of de re modality, and to meet satisfactorily Kripke's claim, while being also ontologically more 'parsimonious'.
Keywords possible worlds  branching  modal realism
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Branching and (in)Determinism.Jiri Benovsky - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):151-173.

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