Comments on Dennett from a cautious ally

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385 (1993)
In these notes, unadorned page numbers under 350 refer to Dennett (1987) - The Intentional Stance, hereafter referred to as Stance - and ones over 495 refer to Dennett (1988) - mostly to material by him but occasionally to remarks of his critics. Since the notes will focus on disagreements, I should say now that I am in Dennett’s camp and am deeply in debt to his work in the philosophy of mind, which I think is wider, deeper, more various and more fruitful than mine or anyone else’s. Still, I have some ideas and emphases that I think he could profit from. In the final chapter of Stance Dennett compares his work with that of several others, including me. He sees me as having a position like his, the main difference being that I think (as he doesn’t) that our attributions of mental content can always be highly determinate (pp. 347f). In fact, there are differences between us but this isn’t one of them. I want to get this straight, so as to clear the decks for the positive points I am going to make. There is some indeterminacy and there could be lots of it; Dennett’s case for that is unanswerable. As for how much there actually is: I don’t know and don’t even suspect; there is simply no declared issue between Dennett and myself on that. Nor do we disagree on a related matter. If there is no evidence that settles whether the animal believes that P or believes that Q, should we say that nevertheless one of these is right, and it’s just that we can’t know which it is? Dennett says No. I perfectly agree
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0140525X00030673
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,472
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Reading Mother Nature's Mind.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
Dennett on Intentional Systems.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):39-62.
On the Evolution of Intentionality as Seen From the Intentional Stance.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1994 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):287-310.
Dennett on Free Will.Craig Ross - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):137-149.
Precis of the Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.
Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.
Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness.Susan Schneider - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 313--24.
Dennett's Little Grains of Salt.Gregory McCulloch - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):1-12.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
116 ( #45,041 of 2,210,543 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #207,666 of 2,210,543 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature