Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):345-365 (2011)
I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. The core view is that size is experienced in ‘body-scaled’ units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye-level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson’s (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I develop handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby avoiding the need to posit irreducible experiential ‘modes of presentation’. I also address a kind of neo-Fregean ‘reference-fixing’ view of size experience, that shares features with the Russellian view developed. I give reasons for favoring the latter. Finally, I argue that Peacocke’s claim that spatial experience is ‘unit free’ is not persuasive
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
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Spatial Attention and Perception: Seeing Without Paint.A. Tanesini - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):433-454.
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