Authors
Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg
Abstract
When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with some – but not all – broadly Humean ideas. In short, I will defend the view there are the experiences and mental states we have, and that's it: no additional substances, and no bundles. This does not mean, however, that there is no Self – the Self simply is the experiences. I will try to articulate and defend this view by showing that it can accommodate what I take to be the three main desiderata for any theory of the Self to satisfy: first, that the Self is the subject of experience (a subject of mental states, in general); second, that there is a unity to the Self in the sense that our (conscious, phenomenal) experience is at least partly continuous or 'stream-like'; and third, that we do not die when we go to sleep or when we otherwise don't have any (conscious, phenomenal) experiences.
Keywords self  metaphysics  unity of the Self  subject  experience
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The No Self View and the Meaning of Life.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (2):419-438.
Immaterialist Solutions to Puzzles in Personal Ontology.Kristin Seemuth Whaley - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What is the Unity of Consciousness?Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity.Elizabeth Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):671-692.
In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
James on Experience and the Extended Mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2006 - Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (1):165-176.
Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances?Michael Pelczar - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
Unity of Consciousness and the Self.David M. Rosenthal - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
The Disunity of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
Sense-Data.Paul Coates - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Critique of Dretske’s Conception of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-01-02

Total views
494 ( #16,545 of 2,462,325 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #53,349 of 2,462,325 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes