Iffy predictions and proper expectations

Synthese 191 (8):1857-1866 (2014)
Abstract
What individuates the speech act of prediction? The standard view is that prediction is individuated by the fact that it is the unique speech act that requires future-directed content. We argue against this view and two successor views. We then lay out several other potential strategies for individuating prediction, including the sort of view we favor. We suggest that prediction is individuated normatively and has a special connection to the epistemic standards of expectation. In the process, we advocate some constraints that we think a good theory of prediction should respect
Keywords Prediction  Assertion  Speech acts  Epistemic norms  Constitutive norms
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0377-y
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References found in this work BETA
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge FIrst?Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - Palgrave Macmillian.
La Verdad en el Gnosticismo.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 3:217-241.
Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - forthcoming - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press.
One Kind of Asking.Dennis Whitcomb - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266).

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