Analysis 78 (2):195-198 (2018)
| Authors |
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| Abstract |
Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer. He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback of being unable to explain nearby cases; and even worse, that account fails to distinguish cases of telling lies from cases of telling the truth.
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| Keywords | lying credences accuracy partial belief epistemic damage epistemic risk assertion |
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| DOI | 10.1093/analys/anx132 |
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References found in this work BETA
Lying as a Scalar Phenomenon.Neri Marsili - 2014 - In Sibilla Cantarini, Werner Abraham & Elizabeth Leiss (eds.), "Certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal space in between”,. John Benjamins Publishing.
Citations of this work BETA
Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.
Lying, Misleading, and the Argument From Cultural Slopes.Lisa Herzog - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (1):77-93.
Lying, more or less: a computer simulation study of graded lies and trust dynamics.Borut Trpin, Anna Dobrosovestnova & Sebastian J. Götzendorfer - 2020 - Synthese:1-28.
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