Mental painkillers and reasons for pain

Manuscrito 41 (4):1-32 (2018)
Authors
Hagit Benbaji
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Abstract
What does bodily pain have in common with mental pain? According to “evaluativism,” both are representations of something bad. This paper puts forward three claims. First, that evaluativism vis-à-vis bodily pain is false for it renders it irrational to take painkillers. Second, that evaluativism vis-à-vis mental pain is true. Third, that this difference between bodily and mental pain stems from the fact that only the latter is normative, that is, based on reasons. The normative difference between bodily and mental pain implies that mental pains are not bad, while bodily pains are not representations.
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DOI 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.hb
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References found in this work BETA

The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ”Appropriateness' of Emotions.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.

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