Non-Archimedean Probability

Milan Journal of Mathematics 81 (1):121-151 (2013)
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Abstract

We propose an alternative approach to probability theory closely related to the framework of numerosity theory: non-Archimedean probability (NAP). In our approach, unlike in classical probability theory, all subsets of an infinite sample space are measurable and only the empty set gets assigned probability zero (in other words: the probability functions are regular). We use a non-Archimedean field as the range of the probability function. As a result, the property of countable additivity in Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of probability is replaced by a different type of infinite additivity.

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Author Profiles

Leon Horsten
Universität Konstanz

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References found in this work

[Omnibus Review].H. Jerome Keisler - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (2):342-344.

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