Authors
Majid D. Beni
Middle East Technical University
Abstract
The paper aims to evaluate the success of two different philosophical interpretations of prediction error minimisation theory in dissolving a notorious problem of philosophy, i.e., the New Evil Demon Problem. In this paper, I argue that the inferentialist interpretation could not dissolve the strong form of ned. Alternatively, the embodied construaldissolves ned. However, in doing so, i.e., in dispensing with the cognitive judgment, the embodied construal might also eliminate some basic concepts of epistemology.
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DOI 10.1163/22105700-20191372
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