Proxy “Actualism”

Philosophical Studies 129 (2):263-294 (2006)
Abstract
  Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-1641-2
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.D. M. Armstrong - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1963 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963):83-94.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
The Things That Aren’T Actually There.Richard Woodward - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):155-166.

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