Abstract
Some recent defenses of fallibilism have sought to reconcile the claim, 'i know that "p"', with the claim that one might nevertheless be in error. i argue that this cannot be done. the logic of fallibilism requires that 'i know that "p"' be replaced with 'i "believe" that i know that "p"'. in that case, one is not asserting the possession of justified true belief, but only of justified belief, which alone allows consistently for the possibility of error
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