Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (3):1-4 (2008)

Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg
Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.
Keywords vagueness, objects, metaphysics
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DOI 10.12697/spe.2008.1.3.01
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
The Ontology of Physical Objects. [REVIEW]William R. Carter - 1990 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):122-126.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):701-708.

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