Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (3):1-4 (2008)
AbstractOrdinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.
Similar books and articles
The Naive Conception of Material Objects: A Defense.Daniel Z. Korman - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin
The deflationary metaontology of Thomasson's ordinary objects.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (3):142-157.
Does the Sun Exist?Peter M. Simons - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:89-97.
Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity.Elisa Paganini - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):351-362.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter.Mark Heller - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.