Philosophical Studies 141 (2):175-190 (2008)

Authors
Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg
Abstract
In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of 'equivalent' to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps : first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of the bundle theory with universals that is not be equivalent to any other view; and the diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other views; and here again it's precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing.
Keywords bundle theory  substratum theory  metaontology
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9158-0
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance.Peter Simons - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):553-575.
Is There a Problem About Persistence?Mark Johnston & Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1):107-156.
"Bare Particulars".Theodore Sider - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
Three Versions of the Bundle Theory.James Van Cleve - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (1):95 - 107.

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Citations of this work BETA

The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.
Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1.
No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
Yes: Bare Particulars!Niall Connolly - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1355-1370.

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