Philosophia 9 (2):219-229 (1980)
The correspondence theory of truth provides standard semantics with a simple scheme for evaluating sentences. This scheme however depends on the existence of basic correspondences between singular terms and objects, And thus breaks down in the case of non-Denoting singular terms. An alternative to the correspondence theory is thus called for in dealing with such terms. The author criticizes various positions discussed in the literature in this regard, And then presents a solution of his own
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth.Marian David - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42 – 47.
Russell Vs. Frege on Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms.Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky - 2009 - In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Reconciling Deflationary Semantics with Correspondence Intuitions.Christopher S. Hill - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (3):291 - 321.
In Defense of the Correspondence Theory.Theodore W. Schick - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:319-334.
The Gray's Elegy Argument: Denoting Concepts, Singular Terms, and Truth-Value Dependence.Andrew P. Rebera - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (2):207-232.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads48 ( #109,094 of 2,171,797 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,702 of 2,171,797 )
How can I increase my downloads?