Mind:fzz003 (forthcoming)

John Bengson
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Review of True Enough, by Catherine Elgin. Reconstructs three pillars of Elgin's view (focused on truth enough, understanding, and holism); summarizes the book's main arguments against veritism and factivism; presents a general recipe for responding to those arguments; raises several objections to the view.
Keywords understanding  knowledge  truth  holism  coherentism  know-how  idealization  models
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzz003
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