The folk on knowing how

Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401 (2009)
Abstract
It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. To the extent that one’s considered judgments agree with those of the folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case against neo-Ryleanism
Keywords Ability  Anti-intellectualism  Intellectualism  Know-how  Over-intellectualization  Praxism  Propositional knowledge  Understanding
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9193-x
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References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowing (How).Jason Stanley - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):207 - 238.
Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199.
Knowing.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):207-238.

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