The necessity of moral judgments

Ethics 103 (3):458-472 (1993)
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Abstract

The first chapter of Judith Jarvis Thomson's "The Realm of Rights" includes a defense of moral realism, in which much weight is rested on the idea that some moral judgments are necessarily true. This paper argues that the uncontroversial premise to which Thomson in entitled is that some moral judgments are necessary, which can be understood in a manner that does not bring in truth and does not support realism

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The subjectivity of moral judgements: A defence.Felix E. Oppenheim - 1998 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (4):42-61.

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