Authors
Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg
Abstract
This article is concerned with the alleged incompatibility between presentism and specious present theories of temporal experience. According to presentism, the present time is instantaneous (or, near-instantaneous), while according to specious present theories, the specious present is temporally extended—therefore, it seems that there is no room in reality for the whole of a specious present, if presentism is true. It seems then that one of the two claims—presentism or the specious present theory—has to go. I shall argue that this kind of worries is mislead. Once we understand properly how our phenomenal experience as of passage and as of change, such as it is understood by specious present theorists, comes into being, the apparent phenomenologico-metaphysical conflict will disappear. In short, the mistake here is to presuppose that there is a link between phenomenology and metaphysics stronger than it actually is. Presentism is a metaphysical theory about what exists. Specious presentism is a phenomenological theory about how things appear to us in experience. As we will see, the two claims are not in conflict, and are in fact entirely orthogonal
Keywords presentism  specious present  phenomenology  metaphysics of time
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0120-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Experience and Perception of Time.Robin Le Poidevin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Some Metaphysical Questions About the Doctrine of the 'Specious Present'.C. T. K. Chari - 1951 - Philosophical Quarterly (India) 23 (October):129-138.
The Specious Present.J. D. Mabbott - 1955 - Mind 64 (July):376-383.
Duration and the Specious Present.Gustav Bergmann - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (January):39-47.
How Long is Now? Phenomenology and the Specious Present.Susan Pockett - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):55-68.
No Time Travel for Presentists.Steven D. Hales - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.
A Defense of Transient Presentism.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):191 - 212.
Presentism and Grounding Past Truths.Matthew Davidson - 2013 - In Roberto Ciuni, Giuliano Torrengo & Kristie Miller (eds.), New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism. Verlag. pp. 153-172.
Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-18.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-11-23

Total views
415 ( #20,898 of 2,455,621 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #35,521 of 2,455,621 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes