A Case Against the Contemporary Taxonomy of Views on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Berkeley's Account of Free Will and Agency.
AbstractMy paper provides a preliminary work towards a theory of freedom and agency which I name "Theory of Procedural Agency (TPA)". Since TPA relies on intuitions which can not be settled into the metaphysical framework of contemporary approaches to freedom and agency, I focus on some reasons which explain why these intuitions should be preferred to the competing ones. My strategy is to argue for my view defending an embryonal version of TPA, that is Berkeley's considerations on free will, agency and determinism. In the first section I deal with Berkeley's treatment of free will. My idea is that his arguments offer clear and evident reasons in support of the first intuition grounding a TPA like approach to freedom. In the second section I move some criticisms to Berkeley's theory of will, claiming that, in order to overcome these, the assumption of the constitution view concerning self-knowledge would help. In the third section I set forth a logical formulation for TPA, showing how Berkeley's consideration on agency provide grounding reasons for that. Finally, in the last section, I plan the work to be done to achieve a consistent and complete version of TPA.
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