Synthese 197 (12):5101-5116 (2020)

Sven Bernecker
University of Cologne
The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe and qualifies as knowledge if and only if it is formed by method M, such that her beliefs in p and her beliefs in relevantly similar propositions formed by M in all nearby worlds are true. This paper argues that global method safety is too restrictive. First, the agent may not know relevantly similar propositions via M because the belief that p is the only possible outcome of M. Second, there are cases where there is a fine-grained belief that is unsafe and a relevantly similar coarse-grained belief that is safe and where both beliefs are based on the same method M. Third, the reliability of conditional reasoning, a basic belief-forming method, seems to be sensitive to fine-grained contents, as suggested by the wide variation in success rates for thematic versions of the Wason selection task.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-02008-5
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-13.
Better Virtuous Than Safe.Haicheng Zhao - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):6969-6991.
Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-16.
Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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