Assessing presumptions in argumentation: Being a sound presumption vs. being presumably the case

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to identify and provide the normative conditions for presumptions and for presumptive inferences. Basically, the idea is adopting the distinction between epistemic and ontological qualifiers proposed in Bermejo-Luque in order to explain the difference between something being a correct presumption and something being presumably the case.

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Author's Profile

Lilian Bermejo Luque
University of Granada

References found in this work

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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
A plea for excuses.John Austin - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:1--30.
Intention and convention in speech acts.Peter F. Strawson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):439-460.

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