Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1065-1078 (2021)

Authors
Sara Bernstein
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Debates over what is fundamental assume that what is most fundamental must be either a “top” level (roughly, the biggest or highest-level thing), or a “bottom” level (roughly, the smallest or lowest-level things). Here I sketch an alternative to top-ism and bottom-ism, the view that a middle level could be the most fundamental, and argue for its plausibility. I then suggest that the view satisfies the desiderata of asymmetry, irreflexivity, transitivity, and well-foundedness of fundamentality, that the view has explanatory power on par with that of top-ism and bottom-ism, and that it satisfies the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Keywords Fundamentality  Ground  Principle of Sufficient Reason  Inter-Level Metaphysics
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Reprint years 2020, 2021
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01484-1
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References found in this work BETA

No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
Making Things Up.Karen Bennett - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):49-80.
Comments on Making Things Up.Jessica M. Wilson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):497-506.
Deep Gunk and Deep Junk.Daniel Giberman - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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