Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436 (2005)
Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the objection that externalists who endorse this error theory will be forced to accept a radical form of scepticism
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References found in this work BETA
Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition.Michael Bergmann - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
Externalist Justification Without Reliability.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):205-223.
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