Philosophiques 41 (1):37-56 (2014)

Paul Bernier | : Cet article discute de diverses versions du représentationnalisme de la conscience. L’objectif principal est de défendre une interprétation de la théorie auto-représentationnelle de la conscience (TARC) selon laquelle le contenu d’un état mental conscient serait une proposition de re qui est constituée, en partie, par l’état mental conscient lui-même. Je souligne d’abord certains problèmes importants auxquels est confrontée une des théories de la conscience les plus influentes, soit la théorie représentationnelle de la conscience (TRC) et soutiens que la principale théorie rivale, soit la théorie de la conscience d’ordre supérieur (TCOS) doit lui être préférée. Je montre que les versions standards de la TCOS sont confrontées à un problème de régression à l’infini intolérable, et je propose la TARC comme une version non standard de la TCOS. | : This article discusses various versions of Consciousness Representationalism. Its main purpose is to defend an interpretation of the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness (SRTC) according to which the content of a conscious state is a de re proposition which is constituted, in part, by the very conscious state itself. I first undescore some important problems for the Representational Theory of Consciousness (RTC), which is one of the most influential approach in the literature. I argue that the main rival theory, the Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (HOTC) should be preferred. I argue that the standard versions of the HOTC are faced with an intolerable infinite regress and I propose the SRTC as a non-standard version of the HOTC
Keywords Conscience phénoménale, qualia, représentationnalisme, théorie représentationnelle de la conscience, théorie de la conscience d’ordre supérieur, théorie auto-représentationnelle de la conscience
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.7202/1025722ar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,645
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Conscience Principle.Mark C. Murphy - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:387-407.
What is Conscience and Why is Respect for It so Important?Daniel P. Sulmasy - 2008 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (3):135-149.
Subjectivité et incarnation.Peter Reynaert - 2010 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (8: Questions d'intentionnalité ().
Taking a Feminist Relational Perspective on Conscience.Carolyn McLeod - 2011 - In Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer Lewellyn (eds.), Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law and Policy. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. pp. 161-181.
Nietzsche Contra Freud on Bad Conscience.Donovan Miyasaki - 2010 - Nietzsche-Studien 39 (1):434-454.
Thomas Hobbess Theory of Conscience.Mark Hanin - 2012 - History of Political Thought 33 (1):55-85.


Added to PP index

Total views
31 ( #319,394 of 2,349,139 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #72,176 of 2,349,139 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes