Devitt on Moral Realism

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):63-68 (2006)
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Abstract

In this article the author criticizes Michael Devitt’s Naturalistic Moral Realism, as well as that program in general. The author argues the following: moral explanations do not work; the fact that moral featuressupervene on the non-moral ones does not support the thesis of Realism; moral principles can not be tested like factual ones; Moral Realists Naturalists water down their thesis so much that it ceases to be a form of realism; there are no moral observations in any interesting sense

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Boran Berčić
University of Rijeka

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