Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate?

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635 (2012)
Abstract
Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik’s arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.
Keywords Consciousness  Conceptualism  Color  Concepts
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.023
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References found in this work BETA
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Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.

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