Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635 (2012)

Authors
Jacob Berger
Lycoming College
Abstract
Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik’s arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.
Keywords Consciousness  Conceptualism  Color  Concepts
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.023
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Myth of Color Sensations, or How Not to See a Yellow Banana.Pete Mandik - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):228-240.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
Color Experience: A Semantic Theory.Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 67--90.
Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism.Vivian Mizrahi - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint.Stephen E. Palmer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.
Projectivist Representationalism and Color.Wayne Wright - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
Colors Without Circles?Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):107--131.
Putting Color Back Where It Belongs.Antti Revonsuo - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):78-84.
Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception.John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field.David M. Rosenthal - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-10-02

Total views
152 ( #70,696 of 2,454,519 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #14,653 of 2,454,519 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes