Authors
Michael Bergmann
Purdue University
Abstract
When one depends on a belief source in sustaining a belief that that very belief source is trustworthy, then that belief is an epistemically circular belief. A number of philosophers have objected to externalism in epistemology on the grounds that it commits one to thinking EC-beliefs can be justified, something they view as an unhappy consequence for externalism. In my 2004, I defend externalism against this sort of charge by explaining why this consequence needn’t be an unhappy one. In the course of doing so, I appeal to what Thomas Reid calls ‘common sense’—a faculty or belief source by which we know noninferentially such things as that our faculties are trustworthy. In his 2006, Baron Reed raises what he takes to be serious objections to what I say about both epistemic circularity and common sense. In what follows, I’ll respond to his objections, explaining why I side with Reid against Reed.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00611.x
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References found in this work BETA

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.

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Citations of this work BETA

Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.
What’s the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.Omar Mirza - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):78-89.
Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.
Los vínculos de la cooperación epistémica.Rodrigo Laera - 2018 - Revista de Filosofía 43 (1):139-153.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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