Exclusion Criteria in Experimental Philosophy

Erkenntnis 86 (6):1531-1545 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When experimental philosophers carry out studies on thought experiments, some participants are excluded based on certain exclusion criteria, mirroring standard social science vignette methodology. This involves excluding people that do not pay attention or who miscomprehend the scenario presented in thought experiments. However, experimental philosophy studies sometimes exclude an alarmingly high number of participants. We argue that this threatens the external and internal validity of the conclusions being drawn and we show how a simple visualization of thought experiments can reduce exclusion rates significantly. Furthermore, we argue that focus should not merely be on how many are excluded, but also why they are excluded, and we highlight the role of comprehension questions in this regard. Philosophical thought experiments often rely on the acceptance of certain key premises that may be regarded contestable, and asking comprehension questions involving such key assumptions could be problematic as that may result in some participants being inadvertently excluded from the study, potentially creating a selection bias.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Thought Experiments in Experimental Philosophy.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 385-405.
The reality of the intuitive.Elijah Chudnoff - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):371-385.
What is Experimental about Thought Experiments?David C. Gooding - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:280 - 290.
Thought experiments in aesthetics.Paisley Nathan Livingston & Carl Mikael Pettersson - 2016 - In Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee & David Coady (eds.), A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 501–513.
Reliability and External Validity of Neurobiological Experiments.Wong Muk Yan - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):429-446.
Thought experiments in current metaphilosophical debates.Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 406-424.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-15

Downloads
35 (#445,257)

6 months
17 (#141,290)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jacob Busch
University of Aarhus

References found in this work

Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.

View all 32 references / Add more references