Evaluative Perception: Introduction

In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)

Abstract

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience?

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Author Profiles

Anna Bergqvist
Manchester Metropolitan University
Robert Cowan
University of Glasgow

References found in this work

Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Aesthetic Concepts.Frank Sibley - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (4):421-450.
Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.

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Citations of this work

Moral Perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
There Are No Irrational Emotions.Steven Gubka - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):293-317.
Emotion: Animal and Reflective.Hichem Naar - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):561-588.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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