Folk concepts of person and identity: A response to Nichols and Bruno

Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):96-122 (2016)
Authors
Vilius Dranseika
Vilnius University
Renatas Berniūnas
Vilnius University
Abstract
Nichols and Bruno claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical evidence suggesting that the folk do not consider psychological continuity to be necessary for an individual to be categorized as a person or for ascribing identity over time and through transformations. In this, we assume, along with Nichols and Bruno, that folk judgments about identity can be read off the use of proper names. Furthermore, we raise some doubts about the ability of current experimental designs to adequately distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity jud..
Keywords Folk Concepts  Intuitions  Personal Identity  Person  Experimental Philosophy
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2014.986325
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
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Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.

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Citations of this work BETA

On the Ambiguity of ‘the Same Person’.Vilius Dranseika - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (3):184-186.

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