First Person Authority, Externalism, and Wh‐Knowledge

Dialectica 52 (1):41-44 (1998)

Authors
Jonathan Berg
University of Haifa
Abstract
SummaryThe apparent conflict between first person authority and externalism arises only from needlessly thinking of first person authority in terms of “knowing what.”
Keywords Authority  Epistemology  Knowledge  Language  Burge, T  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1111/dltc.1998.52.issue-1
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