Free will and the mind–body problem

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19 (2010)
Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802674693
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