Giving the Ontological Argument Its Due

Philosophia 42 (3):665-679 (2014)
Authors
C'zar Bernstein
Oxford University
Abstract
In this paper, I shall present and defend an ontological argument for the existence of God. The argument has two premises: possibly, God exists, and necessary existence is a perfection. I then defend, at length, arguments for both of these premises. Finally, I shall address common objections to ontological arguments, such as the Kantian slogan, and Gaunilo-style parodies, and argue that they do not succeed. I conclude that there is at least one extant ontological argument that is plausibly sound
Keywords Ontological argument  God  Perfection  Gaunilo  Necessary being
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9529-7
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References found in this work BETA

The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument.Alexander Pruss - 2009 - In William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Blackwell. pp. 24--100.
Agodelian Ontological Argument Improved Even More.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. pp. 50--203.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Simpler Free Will Defence.C’Zar Bernstein & Nathaniel Helms - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):197-203.

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