Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):86-94 (2006)
This article offers a critique of Karsten Stuebers account of rule following as presented in his article "How to Think about Rules and Rule Following." The task Stueber sets himself is of defending the idea that human practices are bound and guided by rules (both causally and normatively) while avoiding the discredited "cognitive model of rule following." This article argues that Stuebers proposal is unconvincing because it falls foul of the very problems it sets out to avoid. Stuebers defense of rules as normative guides is shown to be either circular or burdened with an infinite regress, while his account of rules as causal determinants of our actions is shown to lapse back into the "cognitive model" that he explicitly rejects. Key Words: rules rule following norms causes social science.
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