Dialogue 56 (3):503-526 (2017)

Authors
Jacob Berger
Lycoming College
Abstract
According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.
Keywords Higher-order thought  Consciousness  Seeming
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0012217317000440
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
Higher Order Thinking.Josef Perner & Zoltan Dienes - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):164-165.
Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
Higher-Order Thoughts and Conscious Experience.Robert Francescotti - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.
Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?Fred Adams & Charlotte Shreve - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (3):251-257.
Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 3: Expressive Limitations.Peter Fritz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):649-671.
Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness.Diana Raffman - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 509--22.
Higher-Order Thought and Naturalist Accounts of Consciousness.Jurgen Schroder - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):27-46.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-07-26

Total views
56 ( #192,229 of 2,455,409 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #73,540 of 2,455,409 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes