Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):432–436 (2003)

Authors
Jose Luis Bermudez
Texas A&M University
Abstract
Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self-consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of 'I'-thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize 'I'-thoughts, even though an important class of 'I'-thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of 'I' as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. 'I'-thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are not. The dependence here has to do with how a thinker understands what would defeat such thoughts
Keywords Epistemology  Error  Explanation  I  Self-consciousness  Thought  Garrett, B
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00324
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Bermudez on Self-Consciousness.Brian J. Garrett - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.

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