Intuitionistic completeness for first order classical logic

Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (1):304-312 (1999)

Authors
Stefano Berardi
Università degli Studi di Torino
Abstract
In the past sixty years or so, a real forest of intuitionistic models for classical theories has grown. In this paper we will compare intuitionistic models of first order classical theories according to relevant issues, like completeness (w.r.t. first order classical provability), consistency, and relationship between a connective and its interpretation in a model. We briefly consider also intuitionistic models for classical ω-logic. All results included here, but a part of the proposition (a) below, are new. This work is, ideally, a continuation of a paper by McCarty, who considered intuitionistic completeness mostly for first order intuitionistic logic
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DOI 10.2307/2586766
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References found in this work BETA

Undecidability and Intuitionistic Incompleteness.D. C. McCarty - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (5):559 - 565.

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Citations of this work BETA

Krivine's Intuitionistic Proof of Classical Completeness.Stefano Berardi & Silvio Valentini - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 129 (1-3):93-106.

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