Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24 (2007)
This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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References found in this work BETA
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification.David B. Annis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
Citations of this work BETA
Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):753-772.
Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity.Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):515-527.
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