Inferential roles, Quine, and mad holism

In Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Distributed in the U.S.A. By Humanities Press. pp. 283-301 (1986)
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Abstract

Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles

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Jonathan Berg
University of Haifa

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