Inferential roles, Quine, and mad holism
In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 283-301 (1993)
Abstract |
Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles
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Keywords | Holism Language W.V. Quine |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.5840/gps19934612 |
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The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore.Georges Rey - 1993 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 61-101.
Holism About Meaning and About Evidence: In Defence of W. V. Quine. [REVIEW]S. Okasha - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (1):39-61.
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