Inferential roles, Quine, and mad holism

In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 283-301 (1993)
Authors
Jonathan Berg
University of Haifa
Abstract
Jerry Fodor and Ernie LePore argue against inferential role semantics on the grounds that either it relies on an analytic/synthetic distinction vulnerable to Quinean objections, or else it leads to a variety of meaning holism frought with absurd consequences. However, the slide from semantic atomism to meaning holism might be prevented by distinctions not affected by Quine's arguments against analyticity; and the absurd consequences Fodor and LePore attribute to meaning holism obtain only on an implausible construal of inferential roles
Keywords Holism  Language  W.V. Quine
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DOI 10.5840/gps19934612
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