Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Mark Jago
Nottingham University
Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
We need to understand the impossible. Francesco Berto and Mark Jago start by considering what the concepts of meaning, information, knowledge, belief, fiction, conditionality, and counterfactual supposition have in common. They are all concepts which divide the world up more finely than logic does. Logically equivalent sentences may carry different meanings and information and may differ in how they're believed. Fictions can be inconsistent yet meaningful. We can suppose impossible things without collapsing into total incoherence. Yet for the leading philosophical theories of meaning, these phenomena are an unfathomable mystery. To understand these concepts, we need a metaphysical, logical, and conceptual grasp of situations that could not possibly exist: Impossible Worlds. This book discusses the metaphysics of impossible worlds and applies the concept to a range of central topics and open issues in logic, semantics, and philosophy. It considers problems in the logic of knowledge, the meaning of alternative logics, models of imagination and mental simulation, the theory of information, truth in fiction, the meaning of conditional statements, and reasoning about the impossible. In all these cases, impossible worlds have an essential role to play.
Keywords Impossible worlds  Possible worlds  Hyperintensionality  Epistemic logic  Information  Counterpossibles  Imagination  Truth in fiction  Relevant logic
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013).
Viewing-as Explanations and Ontic Dependence.William D’Alessandro - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):769-792.
The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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