The institutional theory of property is that view that property rights are entirely and essentially conventional and are the creatures of states and coercively backed legal systems. In this paper, I argue that, although states and legal systems have a valuable role in deﬁning property rights, the institutional story is not the whole story. Rather, the property rights hat we have reason to recognize as part of justice are partly conventional in character and partly rooted in universal human interests and dispositions.
|Keywords||justice property institutions naturalism Kant poltical philosophy rights natural rights liberalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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