Oxford University Press (2006)

Authors
Michael Bergmann
Purdue University
Abstract
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism
Keywords Externalism (Philosophy of mind  Philosophy of mind  Knowledge, Theory of  Individualism
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Reprint years 2009
Buy this book $26.99 used (47% off)   $27.95 new (45% off)   Amazon page
Call number BD418.3.B46 2006
ISBN(s) 9780199275748   0199562423   9780199562428   0387848983   0199275742   0191534668
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.

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